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 II.-323 
NO CHILD WAS HARMED IN THE MAKING 
OF THIS VIDEO: MORPHED CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY AND THE  
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Abstract: On February 13, 2020, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in 
United States v. Mecham, that the First Amendment does not protect morphed 
child pornography as a form of speech. The Fifth Circuit found that “morphed 
child pornography” is like “real child pornography” because the content harms 
the emotional health and reputation of a child. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that 
the First Amendment excludes both forms of child pornography from protection. 
The Sixth and Second Circuits follow this rule, emphasizing that the government 
has a strong imperative to intervene in situations that harm children. In contrast, 
the Eighth Circuit has held that, under the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in 
United States v. Stevens, the First Amendment protects morphed child pornogra-
phy unless it depicts an underlying crime. Therefore, in the Eighth Circuit, the 
First Amendment protects morphed child pornography that does not capture the 
real sexual abuse of a child. The Supreme Court denied Mecham certiorari, and 
the Court has not addressed the treatment of morphed child pornography under 
the First Amendment substantively. This Comment argues that the Fifth Circuit 
correctly decided Mecham by holding that the First Amendment does not protect 
morphed child pornography. It also argues that the Eighth Circuit minority hold-
ing is erroneous because it fails to show judicial restraint and disregards policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
When the United States codified its first laws against child pornography 
in the 1970s, child pornography could only feature real sexual abuse against 
children.1 As the demand for photo and video altering technology has explod-
                                                                                                                      
 1 See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (criminalizing child pornography); Stacey Steinberg, Changing Faces: 
Morphed Child Pornography Images and the First Amendment, 68 EMORY L.J. 909, 915 (2019) (not-
ing that child pornography laws in the early 1990s did not account for the advancements in technology 
that led to the rise of digitally created child pornography). Congress codified the first child pornogra-
phy statute in 1977. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (criminalizing real child pornography, which does not in-
volve the use of modern digital editing technology). Nearly twenty years later, Adobe began selling 
Photoshop, the photo and video editing software through which many individuals create morphed 
pornographic images, on a mass scale. See Adobe Photoshop, BRITANNICA (Dec. 11, 2008), https://
www.britannica.com/technology/Adobe-Photoshop [https://perma.cc/UNW6-AKT9] (describing the 
history and production of the Adobe Photoshop technology). See generally Brian Yamada, Por-
noshopped: Why California Should Adopt the Federal Standard for Child Pornography, 32 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 229 (2012) (examining the influence of new technology on child pornography). 
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ed, so have its uses in both the legal and illicit pornography industries.2 Socie-
ty now faces an unanticipated phenomenona genre of child pornography that 
does not feature the sexual abuse of children.3 
Perhaps the most contentious development in child pornography is mor-
phed child pornography, in which the faces of real children are superimposed 
upon adult actors engaged in sex acts.4 Initially state and federal legislators 
took a strong stance by categorically banning all pornography featuring the 
likeness of real children.5 In response, the Eighth Circuit ruled that laws ban-
ning morphed child pornography may violate the First Amendment right to 
free speech.6 The Eighth Circuit emphasizes that if there is no underlying 
crime, namely the sexual abuse of a child, the pornography is protected speech 
                                                                                                                      
 2 See Yamada, supra note 1, at 229–30 (describing the rapidly growing use of Photoshop to pro-
duce child pornography); see also Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 
653 (2003) (calling pornography the most popular, and potentially the earliest, use of the internet, 
followed by the trading of pirated content). The use of Photoshop and artificial intelligence (AI) in 
photo and video editing is rampant in both legal and unlawful pornography. Megan Farokhmanesh, Is 
It Legal to Swap Someone’s Face into Porn Without Consent?, THE VERGE (Jan. 30, 2018), https://
www.theverge.com/2018/1/30/16945494/deepfakes-porn-face-swap-legal [https://perma.cc/2XZA-
WWJE] (describing the rise of AI’s role in the creation of hyper-realistic pornography videos super-
imposed with the faces of celebrities and other real people). AI describes when a robot or computer 
has the capacity to complete tasks like a sentient human being. B.J. Copeland, Artificial Intelligence, 
BRITANNICA (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence [https://
perma.cc/N97N-NLKQ]. 
 3 See Yamada, supra note 1, at 229–30 (clarifying that technological advances allow child por-
nographers to create content in ways that traditional legislation does not address). Another form of 
technology that is revolutionizing pornography is deepfake technology. Matt Burgess, Deepfake Porn 
Is Now Mainstream. And Major Sites Are Cashing In, WIRED (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.wired.co.
uk/article/deepfake-porn-websites-videos-law [https://perma.cc/G2GR-RNVU]. Deepfakes use artifi-
cial intelligence to create hyper-realistic videos in which the editor superimposes the face of an indi-
vidual over the body of another person. See Farokhmanesh, supra note 2 (explaining the rise of deepfake 
technology in pornography). The subjects of these videos are usually celebrities. See Burgess, supra 
(noting prominent deepfakes, such as actress Emma Watson and singer Billie Eilish). Child pornog-
raphers also use deepfake technology to create realistic morphed and virtual child pornography. Jacob 
Young, Deep Fakes, FaceApp and Child Pornography, MEDIUM (Oct. 9, 2019), https://medium.com/
@jacobyoung84/deep-fakes-faceapp-and-child-pornography-63ee23e56f30 [https://perma.cc/96TZ-
W3SF].  
 4 See United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020) 
(noting that there are well reasoned justifications both for and against First Amendment protection of 
morphed child pornography). See generally Richard Bernstein, Must the Children Be Sacrificed?: The 
Tension Between Emerging Imaging Technology, Free Speech, and Protecting Children, 31 RUTGERS 
COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 406 (2005) (noting the convergence of the First Amendment with new-age 
technology and the law surrounding child pornography). 
 5 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (criminalizing real and morphed child pornography), invalidated in part 
by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Mecham, 950 F.3d at 262 (noting that Con-
gress expanded the definition of child pornography following the widespread use of the internet and 
computers). 
 6 See United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects morphed child pornography unless the content depicts an underlying crime). See 
generally U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting laws that limit free speech). 
2021] Morphed Child Pornography and the First Amendment II.-325 
under the First Amendment.7 Other courts have upheld laws prohibiting mor-
phed child pornography because the children featured face trauma and reputa-
tional harm like in real child pornography.8 
On February 13, 2020, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Mecham, 
joined the majority and held that the First Amendment categorically excludes 
morphed child pornography from its protection.9 Because the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in March of 2020, the constitutionality of laws banning mor-
phed child pornography remains an open question.10 
In light of the current uncertainty, this Comment argues that the First 
Amendment should not protect morphed child pornography because the harm 
inflicted on the featured children is significant enough to justify government 
intervention.11 Part I of this Comment provides an overview of obscenity and 
child pornography legislation, including technological advances in pornogra-
phy, and introduces the Mecham case.12 Part II outlines the Supreme Court’s 
past decisions regarding several forms of child pornography and various circuit 
courts’ treatment of morphed child pornography in relation to the First 
Amendment.13 Finally, Part III argues that the majority holding of the Fifth 
                                                                                                                      
 7 See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895 (citing United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2005)) 
(noting that the Eighth Circuit’s 2005 holding in United States v. Bach that the defendant could be 
charged with possession of child pornography under the First Amendment was still good law because 
the underlying video featured the sexual abuse of a child). 
 8 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 (holding that morphed child pornography is like real pornography 
because both harm real children); Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 883 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
First Amendment does not protect morphed child pornography because it injures the interests of real 
children and has de minimis artistic value); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 
2011) (holding that the federal and state governments may criminalize morphed child pornography 
because it causes emotional and reputational harm to child victims). Morphed child pornography 
harms the reputations of child subjects if someone recognizes the child and believes they engaged in 
the sex acts featured. See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 (explaining how morphed child pornography 
causes children reputational harm). Such pornography also causes emotional harm if the child knows 
that a sexualized image with their likeness exists and that adults who sexually abuse children may 
view and distribute the images. See id. (noting that morphed child pornography causes psychological 
trauma to children). 
 9 See 950 F.3d at 267 (joining the Sixth and Second Circuits in finding that the First Amendment 
does not apply to morphed child pornography); Boland, 698 F.3d at 883 (holding that victims of mor-
phed child pornography may recover damages under the tortious cause of action in a child pornogra-
phy statute); Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730 (holding that the First Amendment excludes morphed child 
pornography using the face of a real minor from protection). 
 10 Mecham v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020), denying cert. to 950 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2020). 
The Supreme Court exercises the discretion to grant review of a case in which a party petitions for the 
writ of certiorari. See 13A ELIZABETH M. BOSEK, ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE. 
§ 60:143 (3d ed. 2020) (discussing the meaning behind the denial of certiorari). When the Court de-
nies certiorari, it does not address the merits or affirm the lower court ruling. Id. It simply means an 
insufficient number of justices elected to review the case; it is a matter of choice without legally sig-
nificant meaning. Id. 
 11 See infra notes 101–109 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–58 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 59–78 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit in Mecham is correct, both in its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in 2010 in United States v. Stevens and its consideration of core policy 
concerns behind child pornography bans.14 
I. THE HISTORY OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LEGISLATION, TECHNOLOGICAL 
EVOLUTION OF PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Modern child pornography generally takes one of three formsreal, vir-
tual, or morphed.15 Real child pornography features the sexual acts of real 
children.16 Virtual pornography features adult actors, but the adult actors either 
intend to resemble children or an editor digitally alters their features to make 
them appear child-like.17 Morphed child pornography also usually features adult 
actors, but it superimposes the faces of real children upon the adult actors to 
make it appear as though the children are engaging in sexually explicit acts.18 
Historically, persons challenging statutes that criminalize pornography do 
so under the First Amendment’s free speech clause.19 State and federal statutes 
                                                                                                                      
 14 See infra notes 79–109 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260 (noting that under federal and most state laws “child pornography” 
includes real and morphed child pornography and originally also included virtual child pornography); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (defining child pornography as including real, virtual, and morphed child por-
nography), invalidated in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). 
 16 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260 (defining real child pornography as pornography featuring the 
sexual depiction of real children, often through sexual violence); see also Steinberg, supra note 1, at 
909 (same). 
 17 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260 (defining virtual child pornography as pornography featuring 
adults intended to look like children or adolescents, but not featuring the likeness of real children); see 
also Steinberg, supra note 1, at 916 (same). 
 18 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260 (defining morphed child pornography as digitally altered adult 
pornography using the likenesses of real children); see also Steinberg, supra note 1, at 909 (same). 
Child pornographers superimpose morphed photos and videos with the face of a real child, such that 
the pornography bears the child’s likeness. See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 916 (describing the process 
by which child pornographers create morphed pornography). 
 19 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment does not 
protect child pornography); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (holding that the First 
Amendment generally protects adult pornography). The Court views pornography as speech because 
the First Amendment applies to ideas transmitted through photos, videos, and books. See Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (noting that sexual depictions are not innately obscene and 
the First Amendment cannot blanketly bar them). But see generally Andrew Koppelman, Is Pornog-
raphy “Speech”?, 14 LEGAL THEORY 71 (2008) (presenting an argument against treating pornogra-
phy as speech by noting that free speech principles apply to the imparting of ideas). Although the First 
Amendment only explicitly governs federal action, the Supreme Court has held under the incorpora-
tion doctrine that the First Amendment also applies to states through the due process clause of Four-
teenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause protects First Amendment freedom of speech and press at the state 
level). The First Amendment also contains clauses protecting the exercise of religion, freedom of the 
press, the right to assembly, the right to petition, and freedom from the establishment of a federal 
religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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cannot regulate protected speech without satisfying strict scrutiny review.20 If 
the First Amendment excludes a form of speech from protection, however, leg-
islatures typically may assign criminal or civil penalties to persons engaging in 
that type of speech.21 
Courts agree that the First Amendment protects virtual child pornography 
but does not protect real child pornography.22 There is disagreement surround-
ing whether the First Amendment protects morphed child pornography, the 
middle ground, from criminalization.23 Section A of this Part describes the rise 
of child pornography laws following the fall of obscenity legislation.24 Section 
B provides an overview of the circuit split regarding the First Amendment pro-
tection of morphed child pornography.25 Finally, Section C outlines United 
States v. Mecham, the most recent circuit case on the issue.26 
                                                                                                                      
 20 See Charles W. Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 395, 429 (2014) (noting the general presumption that speakers enjoy First Amendment 
protection, and that the government cannot criminalize their expression). At the most basic level, state 
and federal legislatures cannot criminalize or further limit the exercise of free speech. See id. (explain-
ing how the First Amendment protects speech in practice). 
 21 See id. at 413 (describing the concept of categorical exclusion from the First Amendment). 
Categorical exclusion is a free speech doctrine under which a court characterizes speech into catego-
ries which are either protected or excluded from the scope of the First Amendment. Daniel A. Farber, 
The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 
917 (2009). For example, the Constitution categorically excludes libel from protection, and thus, gov-
ernments may impose civil or criminal liability to individuals that engage in libelous statements. See 
id. (observing that the First Amendment categorically excludes libel as category of speech from pro-
tection). 
 22 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (barring state and federal governments from enacting statutes that 
limit free speech); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects virtual child pornography); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747 (holding that the possession 
of real child pornography is not protected speech under the First Amendment). Courts hold that real 
child pornography intrinsically violates children and thus the First Amendment does not protect it. See 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (asserting that the government has a legitimate interest in criminalizing child 
pornography because it causes physical, psychological and emotional trauma). Virtual pornography 
does not involve the abuse or the likeness of a real child and does not harm real children, so it does 
have First Amendment protection. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256 (distinguishing real and virtual child 
pornography). 
 23 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260 (holding that the First Amendment does not protect morphed 
child pornography). But see United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding 
that the First Amendment protects morphed child pornography as a form of speech). 
 24 See infra notes 27–40 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 41–50 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
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A. The History of Obscenity Prosecution and the  
Advent of Child Pornography Law 
From the earliest history of the United States to the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry, prolific obscenity laws negated the need for child pornography legislation.27 
Up until the 1950s a swath of state and federal obscenity laws criminalized 
lewd material, including adult and child pornography.28 
In 1957, in Miller v. California, however, the Supreme Court held that 
depictions of sex were not inherently obscene and governments could not 
blanketly prosecute them under the First Amendment.29 Subsequent case law 
required the state to prove that a work (1) appealed to a “prurient interest,” (2) 
was offensive to community norms, and (3) lacked value to the sciences, writ-
ing, politics, or the arts to show it was obscene.30 Miller made prosecutions 
under obscenity laws incredibly difficult, leading federal and state govern-
ments to draft the first American child pornography laws.31 Such laws crimi-
                                                                                                                      
 27 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 261 (illustrating that child pornography laws developed later in 
American legal history due to the breadth of obscenity laws). Obscenity laws criminalized behaviors 
that society considered morally reprehensible, usually relating to sex and the excretion of bodily flu-
ids. Obscenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Obscenity laws arose in the United States 
in the colonial era, and early legislatures established them in criminal codes even before the founding. 
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 261 (noting that the history of obscenity legislation led to the ultimate rise 
of child pornography laws). Because obscenity laws were incredibly broad, states and the federal 
government used obscenity laws to effectively prosecute child pornography crimes. See id. (explain-
ing that before the fall of obscenity laws, child pornography laws were unnecessary to prosecute that 
behavior).  
 28 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 261 (describing the history of obscenity legislation). By 1956, twenty 
federal obscenity laws existed, including the Tariff Act of 1842, which prevented merchants from 
importing obscene material, and the Comstock Act of 1873, which added criminal penalties for mail-
ing obscene material. Id. 
 29 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the federal government from creating laws that limit 
free speech); 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect obscene 
material but that pornography is not always obscene). Once the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of 
obscenity laws, legislatures across the country enacted specific child pornography laws to ensure that 
governments could prosecute such crimes properly under the Constitution. See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 
261 (describing how child pornography laws filled the void where obscenity laws once existed). 
 30 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; see Carmen M. Cusack, Busting Patriarchal Booby Traps: Why Femi-
nists Fear Minor Distinctions in Child Porn Cases: An Analysis of Social Deviance in Gender, Fami-
ly, or the Home (Etudes 4), 39 S.U. L. REV. 43, 45 (2011) (outlining how modern courts still rely on 
the Miller factors in analyzing the legitimacy of obscenity prosecution). Prurient refers to having an 
inappropriate, often excessive, interest in sex. Prurient, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 27. 
The Miller test does not exclusively target sexual depictions, nor does it render all sexually graphic 
material obscene under this standard. See E.H. Scholper, Annotation, The Modern Concept of Obscen-
ity, 5 A.L.R. 1158 § 4.5 (1996) (explaining the broad reach of the Miller test beyond pornography and 
sexual depictions). 
 31 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 261 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 48) (describing Miller as giving the 
states a tool to differentiate between sexual content, which the First Amendment protects, and obscene 
content, which legislatures may permissibly criminalize). Child pornography emerged from a new 
need to criminalize materials that depicted the sexual abuse of children due to the new restraints on 
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nalized the distribution, and later the possession, of materials depicting chil-
dren sexually but did not require that the materials be obscene.32 
In 1982, in New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court affirmed that the First 
Amendment categorically excludes the distribution of child pornography from 
its protection.33 The Court used four rationales to explain this decision: (1) the 
state has a strong interest in protecting minors; (2) distribution of this material 
permanently memorializes the abuse; (3) there is little to no value in child por-
nography; and (4) there is a historical understanding that the First Amendment 
does not protect some types of speech because the inherent harm of the speech 
overwhelmingly outweighs any expressive value.34 In 1990, in Osborne v. 
Ohio, the Supreme Court used the same four tenets to hold that the First 
Amendment does not protect the possession of child pornography as well.35 
                                                                                                                      
obscenity laws. See id. at 261–62 (noting that child pornography laws emerged directly following 
Miller, as states could no longer criminalize pornography generally through obscenity laws). 
 32 See id. at 262 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–64 (1982)) (specifying that New 
York’s original child pornography law prohibited the distribution of child pornography); see also 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (explaining that Ohio’s child pornography laws target the 
possession of child pornography). 
 33 See 458 U.S. at 756–64 (holding that the First Amendment does not protect the distribution of 
real child pornography as speech). The state of New York had convicted a pornographic bookstore 
owner for selling two videos of young boys masturbating. Id. at 751–52. The state initially charged the 
owner under both child pornography and state obscenity laws, but the court acquitted him of the ob-
scenity charges. Id. at 752. The Supreme Court solely considered the validity of the New York child 
pornography law under the First Amendment. Id. at 753. 
 34 See id. at 751–52 (explaining the analysis of the Supreme Court through the use of a four-factor 
test reflecting history and public policy). This Comment refers to the fourth factor of the Ferber test as 
“value-harm balancing.” See id. (noting the four factors of the Ferber test to analyze child pornogra-
phy under the First Amendment). The earliest legal systems of the states criminalized certain types of 
speech, resulting in their exclusion from First Amendment protection. Id. at 754. For example, libel 
and fighting words are types of speech where any potential value of the material is greatly outweighed 
by its harm. See id. at 751–52 (detailing that libel, fighting words, and child pornography are classic 
examples of speech that the First Amendment categorically excludes from its protection). The Su-
preme Court has clarified that this method of analysis is not dispositive in the analysis of alternative 
forms of child pornography. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (illustrating that 
value-harm balancing is not the only factor courts should consider); Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265 (ex-
plaining that value-harm balancing may no longer have significant weight in the analysis of child 
pornography). The jurisprudence is unclear regarding how much weight value-harm balancing should 
have on the analysis of whether the First Amendment protects a particular form of child pornography. 
See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (emphasizing that the value-harm balancing of a form of child pornogra-
phy is but one step in a First Amendment analysis); Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265 (explaining the uncer-
tainty in the Federal Courts of Appeals surrounding what weight courts should assign to the value-
harm balancing of a form of speech). 
 35 See 495 U.S. at 103–04 (holding that the First Amendment protects neither distribution nor 
possession of child pornography). As opposed to Ferber, the defendant in Osborne was only in pos-
session of pornographic images of children and did not sell nor intend to sell the images. Compare 
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 103 (applying the Ferber test to a conviction for possession of child pornogra-
phy), with Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752 (noting the defendant was charged with the distribution of child 
pornography). 
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The 1996 Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) added morphed and 
virtual child pornography to the list of prohibited pornography depictions to ac-
count for the advent of photo and video manipulation technology.36 In 2002, in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court struck down the CPPA, 
holding that it was too broad and it criminalized behaviors that the First 
Amendment protects.37 The Court held, therefore, that virtual child pornography 
is protected speech, noting that virtual pornography has value to the arts or lit-
erature.38 Further, the Court emphasized that virtual pornography is not intrinsi-
cally linked to sexual abuse, as there is no child involved or harmed in the crea-
tion of such pornography.39 Notably, the Court acknowledged that morphed child 
                                                                                                                      
 36 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)–(C) (defining morphed and virtual pornography as child pornogra-
phy), invalidated in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Mecham, 950 F.3d at 
262 (discussing the codification of the Child Pornography Protection Act (CPPA)). The innovations of 
virtual and morphed child pornography were products of the mid-1990s, before which child pornogra-
phy was only produced through the abuse of a real child. See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 913 (describ-
ing the rise of morphed child pornography in relation to technological advancements). 
 37 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (criminalizing real, morphed, and virtual child pornography); 535 U.S. 
234, 246–47 (2002) (detailing that the CPPA criminalizes thoughts rather than wrongdoing). The 
overbreadth doctrine, under which the Supreme Court struck down the CPPA, cautions legislatures 
from writing overly comprehensive statutes that criminalize some behaviors that the Constitution 
protects. See The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 844 (1970) (de-
scribing the historical conception of the overbreadth doctrine). Thus, courts strike down statutes that 
intend to permissibly regulate certain acts because their breadth unintentionally covers protected acts. 
See id. at 845 (explaining how courts use the overbreadth doctrine in practice). The CPPA criminalized 
a large amount of speech, including packaging that suggested that the film’s contents were illegal when 
the film did not actually contain youthful actors. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (criminalizing a broad range of 
behaviors surrounding child pornography); Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 238 (holding that the CPPA is un-
constitutionally over-broad because it criminalizes virtual pornography, which governments cannot 
criminalize under the First Amendment). The legal community generally views overbreadth in statutes 
as impermissible because the government can use such statutes to infringe upon constitutional rights. 
See The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra, at 844 (explaining the policy behind the 
overbreadth doctrine as protecting individuals’ rights). 
 38 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 247 (holding that virtual child pornography is protected speech be-
cause it features neither the real sexual abuse nor the likeness of real children). In 2003, Congress 
repealed the CPPA and replaced it with the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Ex-
ploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act). Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End 
the Exploitation of Children Today Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2256); see also Yamada, supra note 1, at 233 (noting that the broadness of the CPPA could 
have criminalized popular books and movies). Justice Kennedy noted that under the CPPA, both the 
play Romeo and Juliet and the Academy Award-winning movie American Beauty, which each fea-
tured child sex acts through adult actors, met the definition of child pornography. See Ashcroft, 535 
U.S. at 247–48 (communicating the value of virtual child pornography to literature and the arts). The 
Justice opined that American culture and art have a tradition of exploration in teenage or youth rela-
tionships. See id. (emphasizing that some virtual child pornography intrinsically has artistic value 
because individuals use it to portray child sexuality in books, movies, and plays without abusing or 
implicating the likeness of real children). 
 39 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256 (differentiating virtual child pornography from real child pornogra-
phy to hold that the First Amendment protects the former). Real child pornography features the actual, 
physical sexual abuse of children, whereas virtual child pornography creates the appearance of chil-
dren engaged in sex acts by using adult actors and, sometimes, computer editing. See supra notes 16–
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pornography fell closer to real child pornography because it harms the interests 
of a real child, but it did not rule on its relation to the First Amendment.40 
B. Stevens and the Circuit Split 
In 2010, in United States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court reversed a convic-
tion for a defendant who created an “animal crush” video, holding that such 
laws violated the First Amendment’s protection of speech.41 The Supreme 
Court opinion distinguished depictions of animal cruelty from child pornogra-
phy.42 The Court noted that real child pornography is distinct from animal cru-
elty videos, as the market for such pornography is tied to the abuse of chil-
dren.43 Further, the Stevens Court explained that the value-harm balancing of 
child pornography in Ferber was not deeply important to the holding that child 
pornography is not protected speech.44 
                                                                                                                      
17 and accompanying text (defining real and virtual child pornography). Thus, virtual child pornogra-
phy does not inflict the same harms to children as does real child pornography, and the First Amend-
ment protects virtual child pornography as speech. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249 (relying on harm to 
children as persuasive analysis behind the criminalization of real child pornography that does not 
apply to morphed child pornography). 
 40 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242 (explaining the similarities between real and morphed pornogra-
phy but ignoring the ultimate question of whether the First Amendment protects morphed pornogra-
phy). Morphed child pornography occupies a middle space, in which it takes on many of the harmful 
characteristics of real child pornography but does not depict actual abuse. See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 
264–65 (explaining the disagreement over whether the First Amendment protects morphed child por-
nography as speech). The conflicting characteristics make morphed child pornography particularly 
difficult for courts to classify in relation to the First Amendment. See id. (describing the circuit split as 
originating partially from the fact that morphed child pornography bares similarity to both real and 
virtual pornography); see also Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256 (holding that the First Amendment protects 
virtual child pornography); Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (holding that the First Amendment does not 
protect the possession of real child pornography); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (holding that the First 
Amendment does not protect the distribution of real child pornography). 
 41 559 U.S. 460, 481–82 (2010). Animal crush videos usually depict women crushing small ani-
mals using high heels. See id. at 465–66 (explaining what animal crush videos typically entail). Indi-
viduals that find the videos sexually gratifying share the videos with each other, much like the distri-
bution of child pornography among pedophiles. See id. at 466 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 48) (explaining that 
the animal cruelty law under which the state charged the defendant targeted the interstate market for 
“crush” videos). 
 42 See id. at 471 (noting that real child pornography is an exceptional category of speech, as its 
creation and distribution creates demand for child pornographers and child sexual abusers to harm 
children). Although the First Amendment has historically excluded some categories of speech that the 
Supreme Court has not noted in past decisions, animal cruelty is not clearly one of them. See id. at 
472 (emphasizing that the Court cannot simply create new categories of protected speech at whim). 
 43 See id. at 471 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. 761–62) (distinguishing child pornography from videos 
of animal cruelty by noting that child pornography creates an economic incentive to abuse children). 
As demand for child pornography increases, it causes the creators of the real pornography to abuse 
children to produce more content. See id. (describing that the Court considered the unique relationship 
of child pornography to the demand for child abuse). 
 44 See id. (clarifying that the Ferber Court did not base its opinion entirely on a weighing of the 
pornography’s harm against its value). 
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Courts are split as to whether Stevens is relevant to the First Amendment 
analysis of morphed child pornography.45 Only the Eighth Circuit has held that, 
under Stevens, the First Amendment protects morphed child pornography.46 In 
2014, in United States v. Anderson, the Eighth Circuit held that, under Stevens, 
morphed child pornography that does not depict an underlying crime, namely 
sexual abuse, is protected speech.47 Contrarily, the Second and Sixth Circuits 
hold that the First Amendment excludes morphed child pornography, like real 
child pornography, from protection.48 They emphasize that morphed child por-
nography harms the real children whose faces are superimposed.49 Neither court 
referenced the Stevens analysis which the Eighth Circuit applied in Anderson.50 
C. United States v. Mecham: The Fifth Circuit Joins the Majority 
In February of 2020, in United States v. Mecham, the Fifth Circuit joined 
the majority of circuits in holding that the First Amendment categorically ex-
cludes morphed child pornography from its protection.51 The defendant, 
Clifford Mecham, created over 30,000 files of morphed child pornography in 
                                                                                                                      
 45 See id. at 471–72 (holding that the First Amendment protects animal crush videos as speech). 
Compare Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 (holding that, despite Stevens, the First Amendment does not 
protect morphed child pornography because real children are harmed in both morphed child pornogra-
phy and real child pornography), with United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that, in light of Stevens, the First Amendment protects morphed child pornography where the 
underlying photo or video does not feature a criminal act). 
 46 See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895 (holding that the First Amendment does not categorically ex-
clude morphed child pornography from its protection). 
 47 See id. at 894–95 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460). Stevens noted that child pornography 
uniquely incentivizes criminal abuse, which the Anderson court interpreted to require that an underly-
ing criminal act be present in child pornography for it to be constitutionally criminalized. See id. at 
895 (holding that the First Amendment protects morphed child pornography because morphed child 
pornography does not feature the underlying criminal abuse of children, despite featuring the likeness 
of real children). 
 48 See Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 883 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that laws criminalizing morphed 
child pornography are constitutional because the pornography threatens the interests of specific chil-
dren and there is de minimis value to the content); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729–30 
(2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the First Amendment does not apply to morphed child pornography be-
cause the pornography necessarily harms the reputation and wellbeing of a child); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the federal government from infringing on freedom of speech). 
 49 See Boland, 698 F.3d at 884 (holding that the First Amendment does not protect morphed child 
pornography); Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 729–30 (same). 
 50 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265 (first citing Boland, 698 F.3d at 883–84; then citing Hotaling, 
634 F.3d at 725) (expressing that Boland and Hotaling were issued after Stevens but that neither ad-
dressed the Stevens holding); Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895 (holding that the First Amendment protects 
morphed child pornography because the maker did not actually sexually abuse a child to produce the 
pornography); see also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471–72 (noting in dicta that the value-harm balancing of 
real child pornography is not dispositive of whether the First Amendment categorically excludes it 
from protection). 
 51 See 950 F.3d at 267 (holding that laws criminalizing morphed child pornography do not violate 
the First Amendment because morphed child pornography is not protected speech). 
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which he placed the faces of his four granddaughters over adult female ac-
tresses engaged in pornographic sex.52 The defendant superimposed his own 
face over the male actors in several videos and emailed them to his grand-
daughter.53 
The state prosecuted Mecham in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas for possession of child pornography.54 He filed a motion to 
dismiss the charges, arguing that the First Amendment protects morphed child 
pornography, but the court denied the motion and later convicted Mecham.55 
Mecham appealed his conviction to the Fifth Circuit.56 The court granted the 
appeal to consider whether First Amendment protection applied to morphed 
child pornography.57 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence, primarily empha-
sizing that morphed child pornography was analogous to real pornography as 
the creation of the pornography harms a real child.58 
                                                                                                                      
 52 Id. at 260. Mecham’s granddaughters were all minors, ages four, five, ten, and sixteen years old 
in the photos he used. Id. 
 53 Id. The video he emailed to the sixteen-year-old granddaughter included several clips in which 
Mecham superimposed her face onto a female participant and his own face onto a male participant. Id. 
A police intervention began when Mecham sent his laptop for repair and the technician discovered 
thousands of similar files. Id. The repairman alerted the local police department. Id. The court in 
Mecham noted that the videos made it appear that the two were engaged in sex acts, and that Mecham 
ejaculated into the child’s mouth. See id. (discussing the particularly egregious nature of the morphed 
images). 
 54 Id. at 261. The state chose only to pursue a possession charge against Mecham, although there 
was evidence that he distributed the morphed child pornography at least to the eldest granddaughter. 
Id. The prosecution charged Mecham with possessing a video of nearly nine minutes that superim-
posed the face of Mecham’s five-year-old granddaughter onto a slideshow of pornographic photos of 
women engaged in various forms of sexual activity. Id. In several of the images, Mecham had super-
imposed his face on the men in the depictions. Id. 
 55 Id. The court awarded a 97-month sentence using the federal enhancement for a child pornogra-
phy offense that depicts sadistic, masochistic, or otherwise violent conduct. See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 
(noting that Mecham also disputed his sentence); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(4)(A) 
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (enhancing sentences for child pornography featuring extreme vio-
lence). A sadistic image is one that portrays conduct that an observer would believe was causing the 
victim in the depiction emotional or physical pain. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 (citing United States v. 
Nesmith, 866 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 2017)). The definition of “sadistic image” limits the application 
of the enhancement to morphed child pornography charges, as in most cases the victim will experi-
ence the pain after learning the pornography exists, rather than in the moment that the pornography is 
made. Id. (citing Nesmith, 866 F.3d at 681). The district court applied a level-four enhancement, in-
creasing Mecham’s sentencing range from 63 to 78 months to 97 to 121 months. Id. Mecham’s origi-
nal sentence of ninety-seven months was the lowest sentence the court could have assigned to him 
within the sentencing range. Id. 
 56 Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267. 
 57 Id. at 263. Mecham also appealed the sentence enhancement, asserting that the court did not make 
a finding of sadism necessary to support the enhanced sentence. See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 (explain-
ing the calculation of Mecham’s sentence); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(4)(A) 
(providing the enhancement used in Mecham’s case). 
 58 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 (holding that the First Amendment does not protect morphed 
child pornography). Mecham relied in part on the logic of the Second and Sixth Circuits: that the harm 
that morphed child pornography causes to real children justifies government intervention under the 
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II. NAVIGATING THE FRONTIER OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
IN THE CONTEXT OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
In March of 2020, Mecham sought certiorari, but the Supreme Court de-
clined to hear the case, leaving open the question of whether the First Amend-
ment protects morphed child pornography.59 Section A of this Part describes 
the minority approach’s reasoning for holding that morphed child pornography 
is protected speech.60 Section B describes the majority approach’s opposing 
reasoning.61 Section C describes how the Fifth Circuit in 2020, in United States 
v. Mecham, expanded the analysis of the majority and the court’s direct criti-
cism of the Eighth Circuit’s holding.62 
A. The Minority Reasoning for Protecting Morphed Child  
Pornography Under the First Amendment 
In 2014, in United States v. Anderson, the Eighth Circuit held that mor-
phed child pornography that did not depict the underlying abuse of children 
was protected speech.63 The court differentiated this holding from a past case 
                                                                                                                      
First Amendment. See id. at 265 (first citing Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 883 (6th Cir. 2012); then 
citing United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729–30 (2d Cir. 2011)) (noting that both Boland and 
Hotaling analogize real child pornography to morphed child pornography). 
 59 See Mecham v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020), denying cert. to 950 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 
2020). By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court has declined to rule on the matter and has not passed 
judgment against or in favor of the Fifth Circuit’s holding. See Bosek, supra note 10, § 60:143 (ex-
plaining that a denial of certiorari does not signify the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the lower 
court’s ruling). 
 60 See infra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 63 759 F.3d 891, 894–95 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the First Amendment generally protects 
morphed child pornography). The defendant in Anderson was convicted of possession of morphed 
child pornography for superimposing the photo of a female minor’s face over the face of an adult 
pornography actress engaged in sex acts. Id. at 893. The court initially held that the First Amendment 
does not categorically exclude morphed child pornography from its protection as long as that pornog-
raphy does not show the underlying abuse of a child. Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895 (holding that where 
morphed child pornography does not contain an underlying crime, the First Amendment protects it as 
speech). The court further noted that the defendant possessed pornography in which the underlying 
content featured adults, not children. See id. (stressing that the defendant’s morphed pornography did 
not feature child abuse). The Eighth Circuit distinguished these facts from those of its 2005 case Unit-
ed States v. Bach, in which the child pornography featured an image morphed on to real child pornog-
raphy and, thus, could constitutionally be criminalized. See id. at 894 (citing United States v. Bach, 
400 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2005)) (emphasizing that because the underlying pornography in Bach 
featured a posed minor, the morphed child pornography captured criminal child abuse). Although the 
pornography possessed by the defendant in Anderson was protected speech, the court upheld the fed-
eral child pornography statute and the defendant’s conviction under it because the statute satisfied 
strict scrutiny. See id. at 895–96 (holding that the government satisfied its burden under strict scrutiny 
that the statute fostered a “compelling interest” and was narrowly tailored to meet that interest); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (criminalizing morphed child pornography under federal law), invalidated in 
part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
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affirming a conviction for morphed child pornography where the defendant 
superimposed the face of a child celebrity over a photo of another minor en-
gaged in sexual activity.64 This other type of morphed child pornography could 
still be prosecuted under the standard in Anderson because the underlying vid-
eo still depicted a sex crime.65 Thus, the court held that, under Stevens, the 
First Amendment protects pornography unless it depicts an underlying crime, 
namely the sexual abuse of a minor.66 
B. The Majority Reasoning for Categorically Excluding Morphed  
Child Pornography from First Amendment Protection 
In direct contrast with the Eighth Circuit, the Second, Sixth, and now 
Fifth Circuits have held that morphed child pornography is not protected 
speech.67 In 2011, in United States v. Hotaling, the Second Circuit noted that 
                                                                                                                      
 64 See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894–95 (citing Bach, 400 F.3d at 632) (describing a past ruling that 
seemingly held the criminalization of morphed child pornography proper under the First Amend-
ment); Bach, 400 F.3d at 624 (affirming the criminal sentence of a defendant for possession of mor-
phed child pornography). The ruling in the Eighth Circuit’s 2005 case, United States v. Bach, reflects 
a similar analysis to Mecham, as well as the Sixth Circuit in 2012, in Doe v. Boland, and the Second 
Circuit in 2011, in United States v. Hotaling, as it emphasized the harm to the child celebrity each 
time the photo was shared. See Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 884 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasizing the 
harm to children in morphed child pornography if another person recognized their photos or if the 
child knew of the use of their image); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729–30 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(noting reputational and psychological harm to child victims from morphed child pornography); Bach, 
400 F.3d at 632 (identifying the harm to the child victim from distribution of the pornography). As 
possession of sexualized, nude photos of minors is a crime, and the underlying photo in Bach was of a 
naked minor, the pornography was criminalnot because the child pornographer superimposed the 
child’s face, but because the underlying image was criminal. See Bach, 400 F.3d at 632 (affirming the 
sentence of a defendant for possession of morphed child pornography). 
 65 See Anderson, F.3d at 894 (citing Bach, 400 F.3d at 632) (affirming a prior child pornography 
conviction involving a morphed image because the underlying image featured a nude photo of a 
child); see also Bach, 400 F.3d at 632 (explaining that the morphed child pornography featured an 
underlying photo of real child pornography). 
 66 See F.3d at 894 (citing Bach, 400 F.3d at 622) (justifying the prior holding in Bach under its 
new interpretation of Stevens by distinguishing morphed pornography featuring an underlying image 
or video of child sexual abuse from that featuring an underlying image or video of adults); see also 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010) (noting that certain types of speech are categori-
cally outside of the protection of the First Amendment, such as child pornography). As the ruling in 
Bach dealt with an underlying nude photo of a child, the material still contained real child pornogra-
phy and the First Amendment did not protect it. See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894 (citing Bach, 400 F.3d 
622) (justifying its ruling in Bach, in which a child pornographer was convicted for morphing the face 
of a child onto an existing image of real child pornography). 
 67 See United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 
(2020) (holding that it is constitutional to criminalize the superimposing of a five-year-old’s face onto 
adult pornography); Boland, 698 F.3d at 883 (holding that it is constitutional to award damages to the 
families of children whom the defendant superimposed onto adult pornography for the purposes of 
trial testimony); Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730 (holding that the First Amendment excludes the morphing 
of the photographic images of minors onto the bodies of adults in sadomasochistic pornography). In 
2002, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court noted that morphed child pornography 
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morphed child pornography was not just a “record of the defendant’s fantasies” 
because the pornography’s depictions harm the emotional and reputational 
well-being of a real child just like in real child pornography.68 In 2012, in Doe 
v. Boland, the Sixth Circuit echoed the logic in Hotaling by holding that the 
First Amendment permits the criminalization of morphed child pornography.69 
The Boland court added that morphed pornographic depictions have no value 
and that banning them does not threaten artistic expression.70 
In Mecham, the Fifth Circuit revisited the logic of the majority of circuits 
under Stevens, holding consistently that the First Amendment does not protect 
morphed child pornography.71 The circuit court acknowledged that Stevens 
may limit the relevance of the value-harm balancing rationale in determining if 
the First Amendment categorically excludes morphed child pornography.72 
                                                                                                                      
causes harm to the reputation and psychological well-being of children, making it similar to real child 
pornography. See 535 U.S. 234, 242–45 (2002) (noting that, despite the First Amendment protection 
of virtual pornography, morphed child pornography is more similar to real child pornography, in that 
it is a danger to real children).  
 68 See 634 F.3d at 730 (noting that the harm that morphed child pornography does to children is 
sufficient to justify exclusion from First Amendment protection). In Hotaling, the court described the 
harm from the morphed child pornography as stemming from the fact that a person could identify the 
children depicted in the photos. See id. (explaining that if someone recognized the children in the 
morphed child pornography, they may face reputational harm). 
 69 See id. (holding that morphed child pornography endangers the wellbeing and reputation of 
children in the same way as real child pornography); Boland, 698 F.3d at 883–84 (analyzing both 
morphed child pornography’s harm to children and its lack of cultural value). The child would experi-
ence reputational harm if another person recognized the child’s likeness in the morphed photos and 
emotional harm if the child knew these images existed and could potentially threaten their safety. See 
Boland, 698 F.3d at 884 (explaining the potential for harm to children from morphed child pornogra-
phy). 
 70 Boland, 698 F.3d at 884 (emphasizing that banning morphed child pornography does not inhib-
it creativity, as virtual pornography is a legal and non-harmful alternative). 
 71 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 (holding that the dicta in Stevens does not change the analysis of 
morphed child pornography under the First Amendment, and that the First Amendment categorically 
excludes morphed child pornography from its protection because it features real children). 
 72 See id. at 264–65 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010)) (emphasizing that 
even the most reaching interpretation of Stevens limits the applicability of value-harm balancing to 
new forms of child pornography in First Amendment analysis); see also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 
(holding that the weighing of value and harm in Ferber was not the only reason for the Court’s rul-
ing). Stevens noted that real child pornography is an incredibly specific case because its creation re-
quires the abuse of children, and, thus, the demand for real child pornography incentivizes people to 
abuse children to make it. See 559 U.S. at 471 (distinguishing child pornography from videos of ani-
mal abuse because the Court believed animal abuse videos did not have the same impact on the mar-
ket for animal abuse). Stevens also emphasized that Ferber required the analysis of other factors out-
side of a value-harm balancing of the pornography. See id. (noting that although animal crush videos 
cause greater societal harm than value, this element of analysis is not dispositive of the treatment of 
such videos under the First Amendment); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (analyzing 
four factors, including the memorialization of abuse and lack of societal value of child pornography, 
in holding that the First Amendment does not protect real child pornography). But see Mecham, 950 
F.3d at 266–67 (criticizing the minority approach as inappropriately interpreting dicta in Stevens to 
2021] Morphed Child Pornography and the First Amendment II.-337 
Even if Stevens rejected value-harm balancing, the holdings of the Second and 
Sixth Circuits still stood because they relied most significantly on the trauma 
inflicted on the children depicted in morphed child pornography.73 Mecham 
ruled that because the Supreme Court recognized the harm to children in Fer-
ber and Ashcroft, such harm alone is sufficient to deny First Amendment pro-
tection to morphed child pornography.74 
C. Mecham’s Commentary on the Alleged Jurisprudential  
Errors of the Eighth Circuit 
Mecham condemned the Eighth Circuit for essentially inventing the under-
lying crime requirement which has the potential to overturn the longstanding 
criminalization of real child pornography.75 The Fifth Circuit, in Mecham, em-
phasized that Stevens merely addressed child pornography in a single paragraph 
of a lengthy opinion about an entirely distinct type of speechdepictions of 
animal abuse.76 Further, the paragraph served to distinguish child pornography 
from animal abuse depictions, not to liken the legal treatment of the two.77 As 
                                                                                                                      
undermine longstanding Supreme Court precedent, which allows for the criminalization of lewd pho-
tos of naked children who are not sexually abused in the photo or video). 
 73 Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265 (first citing Boland, 698 F.3d at 883–84; then citing Hotaling, 634 
F.3d at 725) (holding that, even if the weighing of value and harm was no longer influential in the 
analysis, Hotaling and Boland focused on the harm to children and were accordingly still good law). 
 74 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242 (emphasizing that morphed child pornography harms the real 
children that it features like the victims of real pornography); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (holding that 
bans on real child pornography are constitutional because it harms children); Mecham, 950 F.3d at 
266–67 (asserting that interpreting Stevens as requiring child pornography to show an actual crime 
before it could be banned would constrain the laws surrounding both real and morphed child pornog-
raphy). 
 75 See 950 F.3d at 266–67 (suggesting that Anderson’s holding implicitly overrules the direct 
holding of Ferber, the seminal case for the treatment of child pornography under the First Amend-
ment). But see United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the First 
Amendment generally protects morphed child pornography). 
 76 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265–66 (citing United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828, 838 (7th Cir. 
2014)) (stating that, where it is unclear if or how Supreme Court precedent is changing, lower courts 
must show judicial deference). Stevens merely notes in dicta that the value-harm balancing of a form 
of child pornography is not dispositive of its treatment under the First Amendment. See 559 U.S. at 
471 (explaining tangentially that the government’s argument under the value-harm balancing prong is 
irrelevant because animal abuse videos are entirely dissimilar to child pornography). 
 77 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266 (holding that the analysis of child pornography in Stevens is too 
brief and unrelated to overrule nearly half a century of case law). In Stevens, the state argued that 
videos of animal abuse were analogous to child pornography because the value of both forms of con-
tent is de minimis, but the harm they cause is great. See 559 U.S. at 471 (rejecting the state’s argument 
because animal abuse videos do not have the same impact on the market for abuse as real child por-
nography). In Stevens, the Supreme Court only referenced child pornography to directly address and 
explain the error in the state’s assertion. See id. (distinguishing child pornography from videos of 
animal abuse). The Court did so by emphasizing that the link between child pornography and the 
sexual abuse of children influenced the Ferber Court more greatly than value-harm balancing. See id. 
(lessening the emphasis on the value-harm balancing test). 
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such, Mecham criticized the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of Stevens for lacking 
judicial restraint where Supreme Court jurisprudence is arguably evolving.78 
III. WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT APPLY TO  
MORPHED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
In 2020, in United States v. Mecham, the Fifth Circuit correctly ruled with 
the majority, showing judicial restraint as a lower court and awareness of the 
clear policy implications of its holding.79 Section A of this Part describes the 
jurisprudential wisdom of the Fifth Circuit’s deference, rather than making a 
controversial ruling ahead of, and in conflict with, Supreme Court case law.80 
Section B outlines how the circuits in the majority are protecting against the 
dangerous sentiment that an adult’s sexualization of a minor is not criminal or 
detrimental unless physical sexual abuse has occurred.81 
A. Breaking Ranks: Early Overruling and Contradiction  
of Clear Precedent 
The norms of judicial deference should caution circuit courts from mak-
ing bold moves against established Supreme Court doctrine.82 As Mecham not-
                                                                                                                      
 78 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266 (emphasizing that Anderson diverged significantly from estab-
lished doctrine based on limited authority from dicta); Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894–95 (holding the 
First Amendment generally protects morphed child pornography); cf. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (hold-
ing that animal crush videos are unlike child pornography and, thus, the First Amendment protects the 
former). Judicial restraint is a substantive policy that cautions judges to use deference to higher courts 
and the legislature in making rulings of law. See Kermit Roosevelt, Judicial Restraint, BRITANNICA 
(Apr. 30, 2010), https://www.britannica.com/topic/judicial-restraint [https://perma.cc/67NB-ZYJ5] 
(defining judicial restraint). Mecham characterized the Supreme Court doctrine surrounding child 
pornography and free speech as contentiously evolving because it is unclear if the Supreme Court 
intended Stevens to overrule past precedent that guided the analysis of forms of child pornography. 
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266 (criticizing the minority approach for overstating the position of the 
Supreme Court). Mecham argues that unless the Supreme Court has explicitly overruled itself, lower 
courts cannot act against established Supreme Court doctrine. See id. at 265 (emphasizing the need for 
deference where the Supreme Court has not clearly changed established precedence). 
 79 See 950 F.3d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020) (holding that mor-
phed child pornography is not protected speech, because it harms children identifiable in the pornog-
raphy). 
 80 See infra notes 82–98 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text. 
 82 See Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by United 
States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 74–75 (1982) (proposing that when lower courts 
overrule Supreme Court doctrine anticipatorily, it is often construed as appropriating the power of the 
Supreme Court). The legal community is critical when a lower court overrules Supreme Court prece-
dent based on the lower court’s perception that the Supreme Court is moving in that direction. See id. 
at 55 (explaining the jurisprudential theory that lower courts should not overrule Supreme Court prec-
edent unless the Supreme Court has explicitly overruled itself first). One criticism is that the lower 
court’s act appropriates the duties of the higher Court. See id. at 74–75 (explaining arguments against 
overruling the Supreme Court without the Court acting first). Further, such actions create uncertainty 
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ed, the legal analysis of child pornography and the First Amendment has re-
mained constant for nearly forty years.83 The Supreme Court has recognized 
repeatedly that the harm perpetrated against the children featured in real and 
morphed child pornography is analogous, and both harms are genuine govern-
mental concerns.84 
Mecham correctly stressed that Stevens does not provide the authority for 
the Eighth Circuit to rule anticipatorily.85 The opinion is not written about 
child pornography but, rather, videos depicting animal abuse.86 The Court ref-
erences child pornography only to dispel the comparison between it and the 
“crush” videos that Stevens was addressing.87 The Supreme Court explained 
that the sexual abuse inherent to child pornography makes it a unique case, but 
it did not assert that latent criminal acts are necessary to criminalize a form of 
                                                                                                                      
for a large number of cases, especially at the circuit level. See id. at 77–78 (emphasizing that uncer-
tainty is a prominent concern against overruling the Court). Perhaps most alarming is the potential that 
the Supreme Court will not address an erroneous overruling for a prolonged period of time. See id. at 
78 (noting that procedural difficulty often leaves bad precedent from the circuit courts in place). The 
Supreme Court may not grant certiorari for a variety of reasons, and until another case or controversy 
of the same character is brought before it, the incorrect ruling will stand. See id. (recognizing that 
often the Supreme Court is unable to address bad precedent for years). 
 83 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (proscribing the government from creating laws that impinge on free 
speech); Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266–67 (stating that the foundation of child pornography legislation has 
remained uncontradicted since Ferber); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 
(2002) (noting that morphed child pornography is like real child pornography because the pornogra-
phy harms recognizable children in its creation); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982) (rec-
ognizing the harm to children in its First Amendment analysis of a child pornography statute). 
 84 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242 (noting that unlike virtual pornography, both morphed and real 
pornography cause harm to identifiable children); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (holding that harm to repu-
tation and wellbeing necessitates constitutional government intervention in the distribution of child 
pornography); Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265 (holding that real and morphed child pornography create 
analogous harms). 
 85 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010)) (as-
serting that the divergent subject matter of Stevens and its minor consideration of child pornography 
makes the holding largely inapplicable to child pornography); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (asserting that federal courts of appeals should re-
frain from overruling Supreme Court decisions). An error occurs in the circuits when a federal appeals 
court strays from the Supreme Court’s precedent without the Supreme Court renouncing that legal 
rule first. See Kniffin, supra note 82, at 74–75 (explaining that rash actions of circuit courts cause 
harm). The Supreme Court has explicitly held that, where its precedent seems to rest on analysis re-
jected in other opinions but the precedent directly applies to a case before a court of appeals, the court 
should follow the precedent. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (holding that circuit courts 
may not overrule Supreme Court decisions unless the Court has first overruled its own precedent). 
 86 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265–66 (citing United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828, 838 (7th Cir. 
2014)) (noting that the purpose of Stevens is to address an animal abuse statute and the opinion only 
briefly discusses child pornography in a paragraph of its analysis). 
 87 See id. at 266 (asserting that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended its ruling in Stevens 
to have an impact on the body of case law surrounding child pornography and the First Amendment). 
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child pornography.88 At most, Stevens clarified that courts should not base their 
analysis of a particular form of child pornography solely on the fact that its 
harm outweighs its value.89 
Mecham persuasively articulated that, even if the prior jurisprudence sur-
rounding child pornography was in question, circuit courts should not “read tea 
leaves” to divine where the Supreme Court may rule.90 Where a circuit court 
perceives a future transition in the legal standard, they should wait for the Su-
preme Court to codify that transition into law.91 Mecham rightfully rejected the 
minority approach in Anderson as it not only rules too hastily, but it actively con-
tradicts the holding of Ferber, the seminal case discussing child pornography 
under the First Amendment.92 The Eighth Circuit held that the First Amendment 
protects child pornography if the content does not capture an underlying criminal 
act.93 Lascivious photographs of nude children do not capture a crime, as it is not 
illegal for children to be naked.94 Yet, common sense and the explicit ruling in 
Ferber make it clear that the acts of taking, possessing, or distributing these pho-
                                                                                                                      
 88 See id. (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471) (contending that Anderson not only warps the ruling in 
Stevens, but it also does so in a way that conflicts with the precedential framework surrounding all 
child pornography cases). 
 89 See id. at 265 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471) (explaining that, because Stevens makes the 
point that the value-harm balancing of child pornography was not the only justification behind Ferber, 
the balancing may no longer be a substantive source of analysis in child pornography cases). 
 90 See id. (explaining that circuit courts cannot try to predict the future decisions of the Supreme 
Court to justify rulings that do not accord with precedent); see also Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 
484 (condemning the Fifth Circuit for overruling otherwise undisturbed Supreme Court doctrine); Big 
Time Vapes, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 963 F.3d 436, 447 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Mecham, 950 
F.3d at 265) (emphasizing that circuit courts cannot overrule existing doctrine because of what they 
believe the Supreme Court will rule in the future). 
 91 See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (stating that the Supreme Court alone has the power 
to challenge and overrule Supreme Court precedent). 
 92 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that a criminal statute prohibiting 
the distribution of photos of children’s genitals does not violate the First Amendment); Mecham, 950 
F.3d at 265 (asserting that the ruling in Anderson undermined the criminalization of pornographic 
pictures of children’s genitals which Ferber explicitly affirmed); United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 
891, 894 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the First Amendment protects morphed child pornography that 
does not also feature an underlying crime). 
 93 See Anderson, 759 F.3d 894–95 (holding that under Stevens, morphed child pornography must 
feature a crime in its underlying content for the First Amendment to exclude it). 
 94 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266 (noting that Ferber dealt with and affirmed a statute that crimi-
nalized sexually charged photos of naked children). The PROTECT Act is the most current federal 
statute criminalizing child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (criminalizing real and morphed child 
pornography), invalidated in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). The PRO-
TECT Act criminalizes depictions of the “sexually explicit conduct” of children, which includes the 
lewd showing of a person’s genitals or pelvis. See id. (not limiting the scope of child pornography 
only to depictions of criminal abuse). Thus, the minority approach challenges the most important 
federal criminal law against child pornography. See id. (criminalizing child pornography, including 
lewd photos of children, at the federal level); Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894–95 (holding that the First 
Amendment protects morphed child pornography where there is not an underlying crime, as in lewd 
photos of naked children). 
2021] Morphed Child Pornography and the First Amendment II.-341 
tos are criminal.95 If the minority holding in Anderson is correct, the opinion 
destabilizes the foundation for the criminalization of child pornography, as it 
calls into question Ferber and all its progeny.96 The minority approach effects 
extreme, sweeping change that only the Supreme Court can initiate.97 Mecham 
was wise to reject this usurpation of Supreme Court power.98 
B. Breaking Trust: Antithetical Policy Outcomes  
Under the Minority Ruling 
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the objective truth that the criminaliza-
tion of any form of child pornography rests firmly on the protectionist desire to 
prevent harm to minors.99 The Eighth Circuit stated that the majority mis-
placed its concern for minors in relation to photos and videos that do not cap-
ture the act of a crime.100 The ruling rests upon the idea that the fundamental 
harm of child pornography is the underlying abuse.101 This necessarily implies 
                                                                                                                      
 95 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765) (noting that the New York child 
pornography statute that the Supreme Court affirmed in Ferber banned sexual photos of a minor’s 
genitalia). 
 96 See id. at 265–66 (citing United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828, 838 (7th Cir. 2014)) (emphasiz-
ing that such a drastic change in law is not consistent with such a minor and passing reference in an 
unrelated case); Anderson, 759 F.3d 891 at 894–95 (holding that the First Amendment generally pro-
tects morphed child pornography that does not feature criminal sexual abuse); see also Ferber, 458 
U.S. at 762 (holding that criminalizing lewd photographs of minors is constitutional under the First 
Amendment). If morphed child pornography that does not feature an underlying crime is protected 
speech, the government must meet the considerable burden of strict scrutiny to criminalize and prose-
cute child pornographers who take, possess, or distribute sexual photos of nude children that do not 
picture sexual abuse. See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895–96 (upholding the conviction of a defendant for 
possession of morphed pornography not featuring underlying child sexual abuse, because the govern-
ment justified its intervention under strict scrutiny). But see Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266 (criticizing the 
holding in Anderson as contravening jurisprudential principles and basic logic). 
 97 See Mecham, 950 F.3d 266 (noting that federal courts of appeal cannot overrule Supreme Court 
opinions); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) 
(chastising the Fifth Circuit for overruling an undisturbed Supreme Court opinion based on the Fifth 
Circuit’s inclination that the Court would eventually rule in this manner). 
 98 See 950 F.3d 266 (emphasizing that it is not in the purview of federal courts of appeal to over-
rule the Supreme Court); see also Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (stating that only the Supreme 
Court can overrule its own decisions). 
 99 See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 262 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. 756) (noting that Ferber rejected a free-
dom of speech defense in a child pornography conviction based on the justified interest of the gov-
ernment to intervene where it harms minors). In real child pornography, the child subjects face physi-
cal, emotional, and reputational harm. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing real child 
pornography). 
 100 See Anderson, 759 F.3d 891 at 894–95 (holding that, under the First Amendment, the govern-
ment may only criminalize morphed child pornography that does not feature an underlying criminal 
act if it satisfies the strict scrutiny standard). 
 101 See id. at 894 (holding that the First Amendment protects morphed child pornography that 
does not feature a criminal act). 
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that the trauma from pornography’s circulation is secondary and minimal. 102 
Yet the Supreme Court and many circuit courts have recognized that the distri-
bution of child pornography is one of the most harmful criminal acts associat-
ed with it and thus held that the First Amendment does not bar criminal distri-
bution laws.103 The policy implications of the minority’s ruling are therefore 
divorced from the statutory framework and case law of child pornography. 104 
Further, pornographic images frequently circulate globally, revictimizing 
the child subject every time an image is shared.105 For example, in 2014, in 
Paroline v. United States, the Supreme Court heard a case from a survivor 
whose abuser created at least 35,000 unique files of child pornography.106 
More disturbingly, at the time of her case, the National Center for Missing and 
Endangered Children alone had processed 70,000 files of her abuse from all 
over the world.107 Although survivors of morphed child pornography do not 
                                                                                                                      
 102 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Limits of Child Pornography, 89 IND. L.J. 1437, 1453–54 (2014) 
(asserting that it is common sense that distribution is a lesser evil than creation because all people would 
choose to be the victim of morphed pornography over being the victim of actual sexual abuse). 
 103 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–10 (1990) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
567–68 (1969)) (noting that the Court has historically acknowledged that criminalizing personal pos-
session has less justification in the First Amendment than distribution); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62 
(asserting that the distribution of child pornography creates an economic incentive to create these 
materials); Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567 (holding that states may not criminalize the personal consumption 
of obscene material but may criminalize its distribution); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 
(2d Cir. 2011) (noting that morphed child pornography was more than an individual’s fantasy in part 
because people made it to distribute it). 
 104 Compare Anderson, 759 F.3d 894 (holding that the First Amendment protects morphed child 
pornography where there is no underlying criminal harm in its creation), with Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 
730 (explaining that because morphed child pornography harms children, there is sufficient justifica-
tion for exclusion from First Amendment protection). See generally Osborne, 495 U.S. 103 (holding 
that the criminalization of the possession of child pornography is less firmly footed in the First 
Amendment then the criminalization of the distribution of child pornography). 
 105 See Warren Binford et al., Beyond Paroline: Ensuring Meaningful Remedies for Child Pornog-
raphy Victims at Home and Abroad, 35 CHILD.’S LEGAL RTS. J. 117, 123 (2015) (noting that the web 
presence of a file of child pornography is radically greater now that pedophiles distribute child por-
nography internationally). 
 106 Id. at 121 (noting that the particular victim’s images are some of the most prolifically distrib-
uted images online). The survivor, known under the pseudonym Amy, described in her victim state-
ment that the fear, humiliation, and trauma from the prolific distribution of the images of her abuse 
magnified the harm from her abuse exponentially. See id. (excerpting Amy’s victim statement). Like 
Amy, survivors of morphed child pornography face the knowledge that strangers will perpetually have 
access to their images to use for sexual gratification. See id. (noting Amy’s struggle with revictimiza-
tion from the scope of the distribution of the videos of her abuse). That fear is not minimal and neces-
sitates government intervention. See id. (noting the magnitude of trauma Amy experienced merely 
from the distribution of her abuse). 
 107 See id. at 117 (describing the scope of international distribution of child pornography featuring 
Amy). The National Center for Missing and Abused Children calculated the 70,000 figure only from 
images processed between 2002 and 2014, with files located in Scandinavia, New Zealand, Europe, 
and Australia. See id. (explaining the high prevalence of the files of Amy’s abuse in a short period of 
time). Although the figure includes repeated files, internet distribution allowed the presence of these 
files to at least double. See id. (noting that although there were only 35,000 unique files of her abuse, 
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share her experience of repeated sexual assault, the likelihood that their images 
will circulate on a large scale is not insignificant.108 Mecham empowers gov-
ernment actors to intervene in this profound form of victimization, further ex-
hibiting the relative strength of the majority approach.109 
CONCLUSION 
Considering the various jurisprudential and policy arguments at play in 
the case law of both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts, the Fifth Circuit 
correctly held in United States v. Mecham, in 2020, that the First Amendment 
should not protect morphed child pornography. Although the Supreme Court’s 
2010 opinion in United States v. Stevens may call the value-harm balancing of 
the 1982 Supreme Court opinion United States v. Ferber into question, Stevens 
is also brief, topically unrelated, and vague. In United States v. Anderson, in 
2014, the Eighth Circuit undermined the history of child pornography case law 
by interpreting Stevens as holding that the First Amendment protects child por-
nography that does not depict an underlying crime. Such a radical step usurps 
the power of the Supreme Court and disregards some of the most important 
policy behind banning child pornography. Thus, the Fifth Circuit acted ration-
ally in Mecham by averring the majority opinion that the First Amendment 
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the National Center for Missing and Abused Children found that the files were shared at least 70,000 
times). 
 108 See id. (noting that the global accessibility of the internet made the world-wide circulation of 
child pornography the norm, rather than the exception). 
 109 See United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 
(2020) (noting that every circuit court to address morphed child pornography has acknowledged that 
such content deeply and profoundly harms children). 
